General Philosophy of Science
(with Jonathan Cohen) "Interpolating Decisions." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2022, 1-13.
"A Theory of Contrastive Causal Explanation and the Explanatoriness of Deterministic and Probabilistic Hypotheses.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2020, 10(34). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-020-00299-5
"Histories, dynamical laws, and initial conditions—Invariance under time-reversibility and its failure in Markov processes, with application to the second law of thermodynamics and the past hypothesis" Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 2020, 69: 26-31.
(with William Roche) "Inference to the Best Explanation and the Screening-Off Challenge." Teorema, 2019, Vol. XXXVIII/3: 121-142.
(with William Roche) "Discrimination-Conduciveness and Observation Selection Effects." Philosophers' Imprint, 2019, Vol. 19, No. 40: 1-26.
(with Olav Vassend and Branden Fitelson) “The Philosophical Significance of Stein’s Paradox.” European Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2017: 411-433.
(with William Roche) "Explanation = Unification? A New Criticism of Friedman's Theory and a Reply to an Old One." Philosophy of Science, 2017, 84: 1-24.
"Replies to Reviews of Ockham's Razor - A User's Manual by Kristin Andrews, Patrick Forber, and Gordon Belot." Metascience, 2016, 25(3), 393-403.
"Why is Simpler Better?." Aeon, 3 May 2016.
"Is the Scientific Method a Myth?." Metode Science Studies Journal, 2015, 5: 195-199. [Catalan version] [Spanish version] [Italian version, published by MicroMega in 2016]
"Two Cornell Realisms: Moral and Scientific." Philosophical Studies, 2015, 172: 905-924.
(with Mike Steel) "Screening-Off and Causal Incompleteness: A No-Go Theorem." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2012, 64(3): 513-550.
(with William Roche) "Explanatoriness is Evidentially Irrelevant, or Inference to the Best Explanation Meets Bayesian Confirmation Theory." Analysis, 2013, 73: 659-668.
"Coincidences and How to Reason about Them." European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings, 2012, 1: 355-374.
(with Larry Shapiro) "Against Proportionality." Analysis, 2012, 72(1): 89-93.
"Reichenbach's Cube and the Problem of the External World." Synthese, 2011, 181: 3-21.
(with Jordan Ellenberg) "Objective Probabilities in Number Theory." Philosophia Mathematica, 2011, 19: 308-322.
"Why Philosophy of Science Matters to Science Education." A paper commissioned by the National Academies of Science NRC Board on Science Education (Committee on the Status, Contributions, and Future Directions of Discipline Based Education Research).
(with Malcolm Forster) "AIC Scores as Evidence: A Bayesian Interpretation." In M. Forster and P. Bandyopadhyay (eds.), Philosophy of Statistics (Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 7), 2011, Oxford: Elsevier, pp. 535-549.
(with Mehmet Elgin) "Causal, A Priori True, and Explanatory: A Reply to Lange and Rosenberg." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2015, 93: 167-171.
"Evolutionary Theory and the Reality of Macro Probabilities." In E. Eells and J. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science: In Honor of Ellery Eells (1953-2006), 2010, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 133-162.
"Parsimony Arguments in Science and Philosophy—A Test Case for Naturalismp." Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 2009, 83(2): 117-155.
"Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence: Evidential Transitivity in Connection with Fossils, Fishing, Fine-tuning, and Firing squads." Philosophical Studies, 2009, 143: 63-90.
"Empiricism." In S. Psillos and M. Curd (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science, 2008, New York: Routledge, pp. 129-138.
"Evidence and Value Freedom." In H. Kinkaid, J. Dupré, and A. Wylie (eds.), Value-Free Science: Ideal or Illusion?, 2007, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 109-119.
"Parsimony." in J. Pfeifer and S. Sarkar (ed.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, 2006, New York: Routledge, pp. 531-538.
(with Malcolm Forster) "Why Likelihood?." In M. Taper and S. Lee (eds.), The Nature of Scientific Evidence, 2004, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 153-165.
(with Christopher Hitchcock) "Prediction Versus Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2004, 55: 1-34.
"Likelihood, Model Selection, and the Duhem-Quine Problem." Journal of Philosophy, 2004, 101: 1-22.
"An Empirical Critique of Two Versions of the Doomsday Argument: Gott's Line and Leslie's Wedge." Synthese, 2003, 135: 415-30.
"What is the Problem of Simplicity?." In A. Zellner, H. Keuzenkamp, and M. McAleer (eds.), Simplicity, Inference, and Modelling, 2002, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 13-32.
"Two Uses of Unification." in F. Stadler (ed.), The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism, 2003, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 205-216.
"Instrumentalism, Parsimony, and the Akaike Framework." Philosophy of Science, 2002, 69: S112-S123.
(with Mehmet Elgin) "Cartwright on Explanation and Idealization." Erkenntnis, 2002, 57: 441-450.
"Bayesianism—Its Scope and Limits." in R. Swinburne (ed.), Bayes' Theorem, 2002, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 21-38.
"Venetian Sea Levels, British Bread Prices, and the Principle of the Common Cause." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2001, 52: 331-346.
"Quine's Two Dogmas." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2000, 74: 237-280.
"Testability." Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1999, 73: 47-76.
"The Multiple Realizability Argument Against Reductionism.." Philosophy of Science, 1999, 66: 542-564.
"To Give a Surprise Exam, Use Game Theory." Synthese, 1998, 115: 355-373. "Addendum" (to "To Give a Surprise Exam, Use Game Theory").
"Instrumentalism Revisited." Critica, 1999, 31: 3-38; short version in Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, 2001, 10: 59-68.
"Black Box Inference: When Should an Intervening Variable be Postulated?" British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1998, 49: 469-498.
(with Martin Barrett) "When and Why Does Entropy Increase?." In S. Savitt (ed.), Time's Arrow Today, 1995, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 230-258.
(with Martin Barrett) "The Second Law of Probability Dynamics." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1994, 45: 941-954.
(with Malcolm Forster) "How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1994, 45:1-36.
"Contrastive Empiricism." In E. Sober, From a Biological Point of View: Essays in Evolutionary Philosophy, 1994, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 113-14.
"Why Not Solipsism?" In E. Sober, From a Biological Point of View: Essays in Evolutionary Philosophy, 1994, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 28-49.
(with Gregory Mougin) "Betting Against Pascal's Wager." Nous, 1994, 28: 382-395.
"Temporally Oriented Laws." Synthese, 1993, 94: 171-189.
"Mathematics and Indispensability." Philosophical Review, 1993, 102, 35-58.
"Epistemology for Empiricists." Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1993, 18: 39-61.
(with Martin Barrett) "Conjunctive Forks and Temporally Asymmetric Inference." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1992, 70: 1-23.
(with Erik Olin Wright and Andrew Levine) "Marxism and Methodological Naturalism." In Reconstructing Marxism: Essays on Explanation and the Theory of History, 1992, New York: Verso, pp. 107-127.
"Explanation in Biology: Let's Razor Ockham's Razors." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 1990, 27:73-93.
"Independent Evidence About a Common Cause." Philosophy of Science, 1989, 56: 275-287.
"The Philosophical Problem of Simplicity." In E. Sober, Reconstructing the Past: Parsimony, Evolution, and Inference, 1988, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 37-69.
"Likelihood and Convergence." Philosophy of Science, 1988, 55: 228-37.
"Apportioning Causal Responsibility." Journal of Philosophy, 1988, 85: 303-318.
"The Principle of the Common Cause." In J. Fetzer (ed.), Essays in Honor of Wesley Salmon, 1988, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 211-228.
"Confirmation and Law-Likeness." Philosophical Review, 1988, 97: 93-98.
"Explanatory Presupposition." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1986, 64: 143-149.
"A Plea For Pseudo-Processes." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1985, 66: 303-309.
"Constructive Empiricism and the Problem of Aboutness." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1985: 11-18.
"Two Concepts of Cause." PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1984, 2: 405-24.
"Equilibrium Explanation." Philosophical Studies, 1983, 43: 201-210.
"Realism and Independence." Noûs, 1982, 16(3): 369-85.
"Evolutionary Theory and the Ontological Status of Properties." Philosophical Studies, 1981, 40: 147-176.
"Psychologism." Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 1978, 8: 165-91.
(with Ethan Bier) “CRISPR Gene Drive and the War Against Malaria.” American Scientist, 2020, 108: 162-169.
"Infectious Diseases and the Evolution of Virulence." Auxiliary Hypotheses, 2020.
“Fitness and the Twins.”, Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology, 2020, 12(1): 1-13.
(with Mehmet Elgin) "Popper's Shifting Appraisal of Evolutionary Theory." HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2017, 7: 31-55.
(with Paula Gottlieb) "Aristotle on 'Nature Does Nothing in Vain.'" HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2017, 7: 246-271.
(with Mike Steel) "Similarities as Evidence for Common Ancestry: A Likelihood Epistemology." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2017, 68: 617-638.
(with Mike Steel) "How probable is common ancestry according to different evolutionary processes?." Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2015, 373: 111-116
"Precis of "Did Darwin Write the Origin Backwards?" and Replies to Commentators on Did Darwin Write the Origin Backwards?." Philosophical Studies, 2015, 172: 799-802; 829-840.
"Trait Fitness is Not a Propensity, but Fitness Variation is." Studies in History and Philosophy of the Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2013, 44: 336-341.
(with Hayley Clatterbuck and Richard Lewontin) "Selection Never Dominates Drift (nor vice versa)." Biology and Philosophy, 2013, 28: 577-592.
(with Mike Steel) "Time and Knowability in Evolutionary Processes." Philosophy of Science, 2014, 81: 537-557.
"Remarkable Facts: Ending Science as We Know It, a Review of Thomas Nagel's Mind and Cosmos." Boston Review, 2012, (November/December 2012): pp. 50-55. A longer version, with footnotes, is here.
(with Martin Barrett, Hayley Clatterbuck, Michael Goldsby, Casey Helgeson, Brian McLoone, Trevor Pearce, Reuben Stern, and Naftali Weinberger) "Puzzles for ZFEL, McShea and Brandon’s Zero Force Evolutionary Law." Biology & Philosophy, 2012, 27: 723-735.
(With Edward K. Clint, Theodore Garland, and Justin S. Rhodes) "Male Superiority in Spatial Navigation: Adaptation or Side Effect?" The Quarterly Review of Biology, December 2012, 87: 290-313.
"A Priori Causal Models of Natural Selection." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2011, 89: 571-589.
"Précis of Evidence and Evolution: The Logic behind the Science and Responses to Fitelson, Sansom, and Sarkar.", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2011, 83: 661-665; 692-704.
"Realism, Conventionalism, and Causal Decomposition in Units of Selection: Reflections on Samir Okasha's Evolution and the Levels of Selection." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2011, 82: 221-231.
(with Mike Steel) "Entropy Increase and Information Loss in Markov Models of Evolution." Biology and Philosophy, 2011, 26: 223-250.
(with David S. Wilson) "Adaptation and Natural Selection Revisited." Journal of Evolutionary Biology, 2011, 24: 462-468.
"Evolutionary Theory and the Reality of Macro Probabilities." In E. Eells and J. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science: In Honor of Ellery Eells (1953-2006), 2010, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 133-162.
"Learning from Functionalism: Prospects for Strong Artificial Life." In M. Bedau, and C. E. Cleland (eds.), The Nature of Life: Classical and Contemporary Perspectives from Philosophy and Science, 2010, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 225-235.
(with Joel Velasco) "Testing for Treeness: Lateral Gene Transfer, Phylogenetic Inference, and Model Selection." Biology and Philosophy, 2010, 25: 675-687.
"Natural Selection, Causation, and Laws: What Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini got Wrong." Philosophy of Science, 2010, 77: 594-607.
(with Mehmet Elgin) "Are There Laws in Biology? A Reply to DesAutels."
"Did Darwin Write the Origin Backwards?." Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 2009, 106: 10048-10055; Spanish translation (¿Escribió Darwin el Origen al revés?) in Revista Filosofía Teorema, 2009, 28: 45-69.
"Darwin y la Selección de Grupo." Ludus Vitalis, 2009, 17: 101-143.
"Fodor's Bubbe Meise Against Darwinism." Mind and Language, 2008, 23: 42-49.
"Sex Ratio Theory, Ancient and Modern: An Eighteenth-Century Debate about Intelligent Design and the Development of Models in Evolutionary Biology." In J. Riskin (ed.), Genesis Redux – Essays on the History and Philosophy of Artificial Life, 2007, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 131-162.
"The Contest between Parsimony and Likelihood." Systematic Biology, 2004, 53: 644-653.
"Contingency or Inevitability? What would happen if the evolutionary tape were replayed?, a review of Simon Conway Morris's Life's Solution: Inevitable humans in a lonely universe." New York Times, 2003, (November 30).
(with Steven Hecht Orzack) "Common Ancestry and Natural Selection." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2003, 54: 423-437.
"Metaphysical and Epistemological Issues in Modern Darwinian Theory." In J. Hodge and G. Radick (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Darwin,2003, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 267-287.
(with Mike Steel) "Testing the Hypothesis of Common Ancestry." Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2002, 218: 395-408.
(with Christopher Lang and Karen Strier) "Are human beings part of the rest of nature?" Biology and Philosophy, 2002, 17: 661-671.
(with Steven Orzack) "Adaptation, Phylogenetic Intertia, and the Method of Controlled Comparisons." In S. Orzack and E. Sober (eds.), Adaptationism and Optimality, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp.45-63.
"The Two Faces of Fitness." In R. Singh, D. Paul, C. Krimbas, and J. Beatty (eds.), Thinking about Evolution: Historical, Philosophical, and Political Perspectives, 2001, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.309-321.
"Separating Nature and Nurture." In D. Wasserman and R. Wachbroit (eds.), Genetics and Criminal Behavior. Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 47-78.
"Is Egalitarianism Part of Human Nature?" A review of Christopher Boehm's Hierarchy in the Forest -- the Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior. Imprints, 2000, 5: 85-91.
"Summary of: 'Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior." Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2000, 7: 185-206.
(with David S. Wilson) "Précis of Unto Others and Replies to Commentators (Barrett and Godfrey-Smith, Dennett, Jamieson, and Skyrms)." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1999, 59: 681-684; 711-727.
"Three Differences between Deliberation and Evolution." In P. Danielson (ed.), Modeling Rationality, Morality, and Evolution, 1998, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.408-422.
"Two Outbreaks of Lawlessness in Recent Philosophy of Biology." Philosophy of Science, 1997, 64: S458-S467.
"Evolution and Optimality: Feathers, Bowling Balls, and the Thesis of Adaptationism." Council on Philosophic Exchange Annual, 1996, 26: 40-57.
"Models of Cultural Evolution." In P. Griffiths (ed.), Trees of Life: Essays in Philosophy of Biology (Australasian Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science), 1991, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 17-38.
(with David S. Wilson) "A Critical Review of Philosophical Discussion of the Units of Selection Problem." Philosophy of Science, 1994, 61: 534-555.
"The Primacy of Truth Telling and the Evolution of Lying." In E. Sober, From a Biological Point of View: Essays in Evolutionary Philosophy, 1994, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 71-92.
"The Adaptive Advantage of Learning and A Priori Prejudice." In E. Sober, From a Biological Point of View: Essays in Evolutionary Philosophy, 1994, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 50-69.
(with Steven Hecht Orzack) "Optimality Models and the Test of Adaptationism." The American Naturalist, 1994, 143: 361-380.
(with Steven Hecht Orzack) "A Critical Assessment of Levins's The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology (1966)." The Quarterly Review of Biology, 1993, 68: 533-546.
"Experimental Tests of Phylogenetic Inference Methods." Systematic Biology, 1993, 42: 85-89.
"The Evolution of Altruism: Correlation, Cost, and Benefit." Biology and Philosophy, 1992, 7: 177-187.
"Organisms, Individuals, and Units of Selection." In A. Tauber (ed.), Organism and the Origin of Self, 1991, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 273-96.
(with Martin Barrett and Michael Donoghue) "Against Consensus." Systematic Zoology, 1991, 40: 486-493.
"What Is Evolutionary Altruism?." In B. Linsky and M. Matthen (eds.), New Essays on Philosophy and Biology (Canadian Journal of Philosophy Suppl. Vol. XIV), 1988, Calgary: University of Calgary Press, pp. 75-99. [Turkish version] [Portuguese version]
"Evolution, Population Thinking, and Essentialism." Philosophy of Science, 1980, 47(3): 350-383.
"Holism, Individualism, and the Units of Selection." in P. Asquith and R. Giere (eds.) Proceedings of the Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association (1980), vol 2, pp. 93-121.
"Natural Selection, Behavioral Conditioning, and the Problem of the First Instance: Comments on Terry Smith's Paper." Behavior and Philosophy, 2020, 48: 5-9.
(with William Roche) "Hypotheses that Attribute False Beliefs: A Two-Part Epistemology (Darwin + Akaike)." Mind & Language, 2019, 1-19.
(with William Roche) "Disjunction and distality: The hard problem for purely probabilistic causal theories of mental content." Syntheses, 2019.
“Methodological Behaviorism, Causal Chains, and Causal Forks.” Behavior and Philosophy, 2017, 45: 22-26. For a correction of the abstract, click here.
"Anthropomorphism, Parsimony, and Common Ancestry." Mind and Language, 2012, 27: 229-238.
"Parsimony and Models of Animal Minds." In R. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds, 2009, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 237-257.
(with Larry Shapiro) "Epiphenomenalism - the Dos and the Don'ts." In G. Wolters and P. Machamer (eds), Studies in Causality: Historical and Contemporary, 2007, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 235-264.
“Comparative Psychology Meets Evolutionary Biology — Morgan’s Canon and Cladistic Parsimony.” In L. Dalton and G. Mitman (eds.), Thinking with Animals — New Perspective on Anthropomorphism. Columbia University Press, 2005, pp. 85-99.
"Evolution and the Problem of Other Minds." The Journal of Philosophy, 2000, 97: 365-386.
"Physicalism from a Probabilistic Point of View." Philosophical Studies, 1999, 95: 135-174.
"Morgan's Canon." In C. Allen and D. Cummins (eds.), The Evolution of Mind, 1998, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.224-242.
"Did Evolution Make Us Psychological Egoists?" In From a Biological Point of View: Essays in Evolutionary Philosophy, 1994, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 8-27.
"Methodological Behaviorism, Evolution, and Game Theory.." In J. Fetzer (ed.), Sociobiology and Epistemology, 1985, Dordrecht: D.Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 181-200.
Intelligent Design and Naturalism v. Supernaturalism
"Evolutionary Theory, Causal Completeness, and Theism: the Case of 'Guided' Mutation." In D. Walsh and P. Thompson (eds.), Evolutionary Biology: Conceptual, Ethical, and Religious Issues, 2014, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 31-44.
"Why Methodological Naturalism?" In G. Aulette, M. LeClerc, and R. Martinez (eds.), Biological Evolution: Facts and Theories: A Critical Appraisal 150 Years after The Origin of Species, 2011, Rome: Gregorian Biblical Press, pp. 359-378. [Spanish version]
"Evolution without Naturalism." In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 3, 2011, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 187-221.
"What Is Wrong with Intelligent Design?." Quarterly Review of Biology, 2007, 82: 3-8.
"Sex Ratio Theory, Ancient and Modern: An Eighteenth-Century Debate about Intelligent Design and the Development of Models in Evolutionary Biology." In J. Riskin (ed.), Genesis Redux – Essays on the History and Philosophy of Artificial Life, 2007, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 131-162.
"Intelligent Design and the Supernatural: the 'God or Extraterrestrials' Reply." Faith and Philosophy, 2007, 24: 72-82.
"A Modest Proposal, a Review of John Earman's Hume's Abject Failure: the Miracles Argument." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2004, 118: 487-494.
"The Design Argument." In Neil A. Manson(ed.), God and Design, 2003, New York: Routledge, pp. 27-54.
"Intelligent Design and Probability Reasoning." International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 2002, 52: 65-80.
(with Branden Fitelson and Christopher Stephens) "Review: How Not to Detect Design, a Review of William Dembski's The Design Inference." Philosophy of Science, 1999, 66: 472-488.
(with Branden Fitelson) "Plantinga's Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1998, 79: 115-129.
